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Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of family control of the acquiring firm on acquisition financing decisions. We consider a 
sample of 265 acquisitions undertaken by French listed firms during the 1997-2008 period. We find that the likelihood to finance 
the acquisition with debt is high, compared to equity financing, when the family voting rights are high, which indicates that the 
control motives affect financing choices significantly. We also find that financing decision is affected by control-enhancing 
mechanisms. Study of determinants related to acquirer characteristics reveals that acquirer misevaluation, profitability and size 
have a significant impact on financing decisions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Investment financing is a central issue in the field of corporate finance, and firms attach a particular importance 
to the financing source since it affects both their ownership and capital structure. The particularities of family firms 
represent an interesting framework to study the financing decisions in a concentrated ownership context. Holderness 
(2009) shows that family-controlled firms are one of the most developed forms of concentrated ownership all around 
the world. On the one hand, debt financing may be considered as too risky due to the increased bankruptcy 
likelihood. Thus, family firms are more reluctant to increase firm risk than non-family firms, since these families' 
 
 
1 Corresponding author. Tel.: +216 98 504 005. 
E-mail address:h.bouzgarrou@hotmail.fr 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Tunisian Society for Financial Studies (TSFS)
4   Houssam Bouzgarrou /  Procedia Economics and Finance  13 ( 2014 )  3 – 13 
portfolios are weakly diversified. On the other hand, equity financing may be avoided since new equity will 
gradually dilute family control. Thereafter, future generations of the founding family will be profoundly affected if 
the family loses control.  
 
Acquisitions offer an appropriate framework to study the interaction between investment and financing 
decisions. In this paper, we examine whether the financing decision of French family acquirers is affected by the 
firm control motive or by the risk reduction motive. France is really a suitable environment to undertake such a 
study since there are quite a lot of family firms characterized by relatively high ownership concentration, but also 
companies with existing separation between ownership and control, and finally numerous family-controlled 
pyramidal groups (Faccio and Lang, 2002; Bach, 2010). 
Stulz (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988) support the existence of financing preferences in acquisitions. Based on 
managerial ownership, these authors find that the objective of owner-managers is to maintain control over the 
corporation and to avoid capital dilution. Therefore, owner-managers prefer to finance acquisitions by debt or by 
internal funds rather than by issuing new equity. This finding is consistent with the pecking order theory initiated by 
Myers and Majluf (1984) which assumes that firms prioritize internally generated funds. Then, if internal resources 
are insufficient, firms prefer debt financing, and at last raise new equity. 
Most of empirical studies use the acquisition’s method of payment as a proxy of the source of financing 
(Amihud et al, 1990; Martin, 1996; Ghosh and Ruland, 1998; and Faccio and Masulis, 2005). These studies show a 
significant relation between the concentrated ownership and the method of payment. Basu and al. (2009), André and 
Ben-Amar (2010) focus on family ownership and find a significant impact. 
Few studies distinguish between the method of payment and the method of financing in acquisitions (Bharadwaj and 
Shivdasani, 2003; Schlingemann, 2004; and Martynova and Renneboog, 2009). These studies examine the impact of 
different sources of financing on acquirers abnormal returns. They conclude that acquisitions that are entirely 
financed with debt are associated with large and significantly positive acquirer announcement returns. In addition, 
Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003), and Martynova and Renneboog (2009) examine the determinants of the financing 
decision in acquisitions. They find that this decision is influenced by the acquirer’s pecking order preferences, its 
potential growth and its corporate governance environment.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that empirically examines the impact of family control on the 
financing decision in acquisitions. With a sample of 265 acquisitions realized by French listed firms in the period 
1997-2008, and using a multinomial logit model, we find that it is more likely to use debt financing rather than 
equity financing when the family voting rights are high. This finding indicates the role of control motive in family 
firms. We also conclude that family firms opt to issue shares, rather than raising debt when the wedge, defined as 
the discrepancy between the voting rights and the cash flow rights owned, is high. This result indicates that families 
that use control-enhancing mechanisms are less averse to a risk of dilution. 
In this paper, we also examine the impact of acquirer misevaluation on financing choices. Based on the intrinsic 
value of acquirer’s shares, we show that the likelihood of using equity financing increases when the acquirer is 
overvalued. Finally, we investigate the role of acquirer and transaction characteristics in determining the financial 
decision. We find that the higher the size and the profitability of the acquirer, the higher the likelihood of using debt 
to finance the acquisition rather than equity. Moreover, equity financing is less likely to be used when target is 
unlisted or a foreign firm. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we present the related literature on family-controlled firms, acquirer 
misevaluation and the main determinants of financing decisions. Section 3 describes our sample selection process 
and our methodology. The results are presented in section 4. Section 5 deals with robustness checks. Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
In this section, we provide an overview of the existing literature on family control characteristics and impact on 
financing decision. Moreover, we discuss the role of acquirer misevaluation as a determinant of financing decision. 
Finally, we present the main acquirer and deal characteristics that affect this decision. 
 
2.1. Family control 
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Family firms are considered as a unique group of active, long-term owners, holding sustainable equity positions 
in their firms. Families usually invest most of their private wealth in the company and are not widely diversified. 
Therefore, family firms shareholders would be highly sensitive to a dilution in their control position. Franks et al. 
(2012) show that the different legal and institutional environments make family control more valuable in Europe, 
and that family ownership is a powerful and persistent arrangement. Anderson et al. (2003) show that family firms 
have incentive structures that result in fewer agency conflicts between equity and debt claimants. Compared to 
widely held companies, family firms tend to adopt conservative management policies. Caprio et al. (2011) show that 
listed family firms realize fewer acquisitions than non-family firms. Moreover, they show that this strategy does not 
negatively affect firm’s growth. Franks et al. (2012) highlight that European family firms benefit from a developed 
relationship with their bankers which provides access to external financing. Andres (2011) indicates that investment 
in family firms is less sensitive to the availability of cash-flows and is more responsive to investment opportunities. 
These findings are consistent with the hypothesis of Franks et al. (2012) and provide evidence for fewer agency 
conflicts and more efficient investment decisions in family firms. Pindado et al. (2011) confirm that European 
family firms do not appear so far to be subject to external financing constraints. In order to ensure the 
intergenerational transfer of managerial control, families have strong incentives to minimize firm risk related to the 
low diversification of their portfolios, and to the bankruptcy likelihood. Several studies have analyzed the impact of 
firm control on their capital structure. They have reached non conclusive results. Holderness and Sheehan (1988) 
and Berger et al. (1997) find that equity is more likely to be used when managers are entrenched, since the relation 
between managerial ownership and leverage is negative. Anderson and Reeb (2003) for the U.S firms, and 
Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) for French firms show that family ownership has no significant impact on capital 
structure choices. King and Santor (2008) find a positive significant relation between family control and firm 
leverage that indicates that family firms use more debt than non-family firms. Ellul (2009) suggests that 
shareholders of family firms balance between control and risk reduction motives depending on their level of control. 
One the one hand, the author finds that family firms are more leveraged than non-family firms mainly for a low 
level of firm control. On the other hand, Ellul (2009) highlights that family firms are less leveraged than non-family 
firms when they use control-enhancing mechanisms such as dual class shares and pyramidal structures. 
Based on the method of payment as a proxy of the source of financing, Amihud et al. (1990), Martin (1996), 
Ghosh and Ruland (1998), Chang and Mais (2000) for U.S acquirers, show that managers are reluctant to use stock 
in acquisition payment in order to maintain firm control. Faccio and Masulis (2005), Martynova and Renneboog 
(2009) confirm this result for European acquirers. This reluctance is pronounced for an intermediate level of 
managerial control. Basu et al. (2009) and André and Ben-Amar (2010) focus on family control and find similar 
results. André and Ben-Amar (2010) also highlight the significant impact of the use of control enhancing 
mechanisms on the choice of financing source. 
 
2.2. Firm misevaluation  
 
The uncertainty about acquirer value introduces an adverse selection effect. Information asymmetries between 
managers and outside investors may cause a firm misevaluation problem. Acquirers prefer to finance transactions 
with equity when they consider their stock as overvalued and prefer to finance with cash when they consider their 
stock as undervalued (Mayers and Majluf, 1984; Hansen, 1987; Shleifer and Vishny 2003). An intrinsic value of the 
firm must be computed as a benchmark to market value (see appendix B). 
 
2.3. Other determinants 
 
Previous empirical literature shows that a firm’s capital structure choices are determined by several firm 
characteristics. Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), show that financial leverage depends on 
firm profitability. Firms with relatively high profitability are likely to have more valuable assets in place and, hence, 
higher debt capacity. Therefore, the relation between the two variables is positive. The authors also find a positive 
relation between leverage and firm size. Relatively large firms tend to be more diversified and less prone to 
bankruptcy. Thus, large firms should be more highly leveraged. Based on pecking order theory predictions, capital 
structure choices depend on firm cash reserve. Myers (1984) explains that firms prefer using, first retained earnings, 
second debt, and third new equity. Therefore, acquirers use external financing only when internal resources become 
insufficient. 
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The literature also shows that acquisition characteristics affect the financing decision. Faccio and Masulis (2005) 
stress that relative deal size ratio is negatively associated to the likelihood of cash financing. Martynova and 
Renneboog (2009) find that equity rather than debt is more likely to finance the acquisition when the relative deal 
ratio is high. In addition, they show a low likelihood of equity financing in cross border acquisitions. Target 
shareholders may be averse to an equity offer from a foreign acquirer mainly because the legal environments of the 
two countries are very different. Furthermore, equity financing is less likely to take place when the target is an 
unlisted firm, since target shareholders prefer cash payment to settle their problem of liquidity. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
This section presents the sample selection process, the methodology and main variables used to explain the 
financing decision. Finally, it exhibits the summary statistics of our sample. 
 
3.1. Sample selection 
 
The sample of corporate acquisitions is drawn from completed deals undertaken by French listed acquirers 
between January 1997 and December 2008. Operations are identified from Thomson One Banker Merger and 
Acquisition database. Acquisitions involving firms operating in highly regulated industries, such as financial and 
utility sectors, are excluded. Acquisitions are defined as occurring when the bidder controls less than 50% of the 
target’s shares before the announcement and more than 50% after the transaction. We limit our sample to 
acquisitions whose deal value is more than €1 million and which is at least 1% of the acquirer’s market value of 
equity measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement date. Our initial sample includes 306 
acquisitions with respect to these criteria.  
To identify how acquirers financed their transactions, we checked the news announcements from Factiva. Most 
news announcements do not disclose a very detailed description of the financing arrangement, the exact proportion 
of the sources is frequently not given when more than one financing source is used. Moreover, we cannot distinguish 
whether equity financing occurs in the form of a public or a private equity placement, or whether debt financing 
occurs by means of bank credit or a loan notes/bonds issue. Following Martynova and Renneboog (2009), we divide 
the financing sources into four categories: (i) internal funds only, (ii) debt issues, (iii) equity issues, and (iv) a 
combination of equity and debt issues. As internal fund financing is at least partially used in almost all acquisitions, 
we differentiate between transactions fully financed by internal funds and those that use internal funds with another 
financing source. Acquirers’ stock prices and accounting data are extracted from Datastream database. Ownership 
data is hand collected from Annual Report preceding and closest to the acquisition announcement. After eliminating 
firms which announce more than one acquisition on the same day and acquirers which don’t have available data, our 
final sample includes 265 acquisitions realized by 177 firms2. 
 
3.2. Methodology  
 
To examine the impact of family ownership on the choice of the financing method, we use a multinomial logit 
model. This model assumes that the acquirer chooses a method of financing from four mutually exclusive 
alternatives: internal funds only, debt, equity, and a combination of equity and debt. The multinomial model 
includes three binary logit models that are estimated simultaneously. Each binary logit predicts a likelihood of 
choosing one of first three alternatives to the likelihood of choosing the benchmark, which is debt financing. 
Following Martynova and Renneboog (2009), we assume that each financing choice j corresponds to the net present 
value (net of all direct and indirect costs associated with the use of a particular source of financing) of the 
acquisition Vj(x), where x  is a vector of exogenous characteristics of the acquirers and represents some specific 
features of the acquisitions. Moreover j denotes one of the four financing alternatives. The acquirer chooses 
 
 
2 During the period 1997 – 2008, 131 of acquirers realize only one acquisition. However, 14 firms undertake two acquisitions, 24 complete three 
deals, 6 undertake four deals and 2 realize five acquisitions. 
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alternative j if Vj(x) yields the maximum of the four possible values. Therefore, the likelihood of the choice j is:  
 
 kj V! jVProbPr  for all other jk z          (1) 
 
The model assumes that the (unobserved) acquisition value Vj(x) is a linear function of the observed relevant 
characteristics of the acquirer and of the transaction ( x ) plus a random noise (İ): 
   HE  jj xxV '               (2) 
 
The vector of explanatory variables x  is the same across all three binary logits. For each alternative j, the log-
odds ratio is specified as follows:  
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Where Prj and Pr0 denote the probabilities that the acquirer chooses the alternative j relative to the benchmark 
alternative 0 (debt financing). We set the coefficient corresponding to the choice of the debt-financing alternative to 
zero ( 00  E ).  
The model assumes that random noise (İ) is independently and identically distributed (iid), which implies that 
the choices between any two alternatives are independent of the others. Furthermore, the model presumes that the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption should be respected. This assumption supposes if one 
alternative is removed from the model, the other alternatives will register a proportional increase in the probability 
of being chosen. We apply the Hausman and McFadden (1984) test to examine the validity of this assumption.  
 
Our independent and control variables consider both acquirer and acquisition characteristics. Appendix A lists 
variables used in this study. The family ownership variables and the acquirer misevaluation measures are defined as 
follows:  
Fam_Vote: We use the same methodology as La Porta et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang 
(2002) to measure the voting rights held by the family3. This procedure considers the pyramidal structures and the 
double voting rule. The voting rights are measured as the weakest link in the control chain4.  
Fam_Wedge: The family wedge, or the family excess control, is the difference between voting rights and cash-flow 
rights. Cash-flow rights are measured after taking into account the whole chain of control5.  
Valuation error: This variable measures acquirer’s value taking into account the effects of private information, since 
an important determinant of the financing method is this private information about its own value. We adopt 
Chemmanur et al. (2009) methodology to measure this variable: 
 
 00 /ln   VPErrorValuation              (4) 
 
Where 0P is the acquirer’s closing stock price on the day before the acquisition announcement and 0V is the 
intrinsic value of the acquirer’s stocks conditional on insiders’ private information at the acquisition date. We 
estimate the intrinsic value using the Ohlson’s (1990) residual income model (RIM) following the set-up used by 
D’Mello and Shroff (2000) and Jindra (2000). Appendix B presents the method used to estimate the intrinsic value. 
Given that an acquirer chooses the source of financing observing its stock price before the announcement day 
 
 
3 We consider as family blockholder, an individual or a group of individuals that appertain to the same family. 
4 We consider a firm as family controlled if family voting rights are superior or equal than 10%. 
5 If family A owns 60% of direct cash-flow of B and B owns 30% of direct cash-flow of C, family A owns ultimately 60%×30% = 18% of cash-
flow of C. 
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(Chemmanur et al, 2009), we measure the misevaluation of the acquirer’s stock on the day before this 
announcement day6. 
RUNUP: Chang and Mais (2000), Faccio and Masulis (2005) use prior stock performance as a proxy for acquirer 
overvaluation (or undervaluation). The higher the RUNUP is, the higher the likelihood to use equity financing is 
since the acquirer is considered as overvalued. The RUNUP is calculated as the cumulative abnormal return over the 
year preceding the acquisition announcement month7. 
 
3.3. Summary statistics 
 
Table 1 provides relevant summary statistics of our sample splitting it according to relevant methods of 
financing. Acquisitions financed by internal funds represent 14.7% (39 out of 265) of our sample; those financed 
with debt represent 35.8% (95 out of 265) and those with equity 31.7% (84 out of 265). A combination of debt and 
equity is used in 17.7% of cases (47 out of 265). Mean family voting rights for all acquirers are equal to 19.7%. The 
family control is quite similar and about 20% for acquirers that use internal funds, debt or equity financing. 
However, mean family voting rights is only equal to 14.3% for firms those that use combination financing.  
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
 All 
(265) 
IF 
(39) 
Debt
(95) 
Equity
(84) 
Debt&Equity 
(47) 
Difference 
(K-Wallis) 
Fam_Vote 
Fam_Wedge 
Valuation Error 
RUNUP 
ROA 
Leverage 
Cash Reserve 
Size (€mil) 
RDS 
Unlisted Target 
Cross Border 
 0.197 
 0.043 
 0.957 
 0.008 
 0.062 
 0.320 
 2.250 
 9.147 
 0.379 
 0.630 
 0.588 
 0.211 
 0.036 
 0.812 
-0.000 
 0.080 
 0.258 
 5.008 
 4.169 
 0.047 
 0.871 
 0.615 
 0.209 
 0.042 
 0.767 
 0.003 
 0.077 
 0.378 
 2.173 
 11.80 
 0.271 
 0.705 
 0.726 
 0.206 
 0.061 
 1.243 
 0.019 
 0.040 
 0.280 
 1.822 
 6.099 
 0.528 
 0.511 
 0.440 
 0.143 
 0.016 
 0.950 
 0.005 
 0.055 
 0.325 
 0.880 
 13.30 
 0.609 
 0.483 
 0.553 
 1.003 
 5.634 
 18.50*** 
 1.760 
 11.54*** 
 13.58*** 
 61.63*** 
 23.19*** 
 63.76*** 
 14.70*** 
 15.35*** 
IF is internal funds financing. Fam_Vote is voting rights of the family. Fam_Wedge is the difference between family voting rights and cash-flow 
rights. Valuation Error is the acquirer undervaluation or overvaluation estimated based on Chemmanur et al. (2009) recommendations. RUNUP 
is the cumulative abnormal return over the year proceeding the acquisition announcement month. ROA is the earnings before interest and taxes 
divided by book value of assets. Leverage is total debt divided by market value of assets. Cash Reserve is cash and cash equivalents divided by 
deal value. Size is the logarithm of total assets measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding the acquisition. Relative Deal Size is the deal value 
divided by the market value of the acquirer before the announcement date. Unlisted Target is a dummy variable equal to 1 if target is a unlisted 
firm and 0 otherwise. Cross Border is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the target is not a French firm, and 0 otherwise. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The valuation error variable indicates that acquirers that use equity financing are overvalued since it is superior 
to one and equal to 1.24. Moreover, the valuation error of acquirers that use a combination of equity and debt is 
higher than those that use debt or internal funds financing. The Kurskal-Wallis test shows that the valuation error 
coefficients of the four financing sources are significantly different. The RUNUP variable of acquirers that use 
equity financing is the highest. These findings are in line with those of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Chemmanur 
et al. (2009) and indicate that the higher firm overvaluation is, the more important equity financing is. We find that 
the profitability (ROA) of acquirers that use internal funds and debt to finance the acquisition is better than those 
who use equity or a combination financing.  
Statistics show that acquirers that use debt financing or a combination of debt and equity are bigger than those 
that employ equity or internal funds. Moreover, the relative deal size ratio of the acquirer is highest and equal to 
60.9% when both debt and equity financing are used. By contrast, acquirers that utilize internal funds have the 
lowest relative deal size ratio of 4.7%. These acquirers have the highest cash reserve to deal value ratio. Finally, we 
 
 
6 To check the robustness of our results, we consider the stock price three-day before the announcement date. Results are qualitatively unchanged. 
7 This variable also allows controlling for timing effects whereby acquirers would be more likely to pay with equity following an abnormal run-
up in their stock price (Harford et al, 2009; Martynova and Renneboog, 2009). 
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find that firms that use debt and internal funds acquire more unlisted and cross border targets than other firms do. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
 
Table 2 presents the results of the multinomial logit model. We realize several Hausman and McFadden (1984) 
tests to examine the validity of the model. The tests fail to reject the assumption of the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) since the p-value is at least equal to 0.673. Consequently, we consider the multinomial logit model 
to be an appropriate specification for studying the financing decision of the acquirer. 
Column 1 of table 2 presents the first logit model estimating the probability that an acquisition is financed with 
equity, relative to debt financing. We find that the higher family voting rights are, the lower the likelihood of equity 
financing is, consistent with Stulz (1988), and King and Santor (2008) results. This finding indicates that families 
are averse to a dilution of their control position, and therefore they are reluctant to equity financing. In family 
controlled firms, the control motive hypothesis plays an important role in determining the financing source. 
However, family opts to issue shares, rather than raising debt when their wedge is important. This evidence shows 
that families that maintain firm control thanks to pyramidal structures and double voting rule are less sensitive to a 
risk of dilution due to equity financing. This result is in line with these of Ellul (2009), and André and Ben-Amar 
(2010).  
The valuation error variable shows that the likelihood of using equity financing increases when the acquirer is 
overvalued. Thus, an acquirer misevaluation affects the financing decision. The positive significant coefficient of 
the RUNUP confirms this result. Firms that experience significant share price increases prior to the acquisitions are 
more likely to use equity financing instead of debt financing. Our finding is consistent with Myers and Majluf 
(1984), Shleifer and Vishny (2003). 
We also find that the higher the size and the profitability of the acquirer, the higher the likelihood of using debt to 
finance the transaction rather than with equity. These findings show that large firms are likely to have a higher debt 
capacity resulting from greater diversification. Moreover, large firms are less prone to bankruptcy. Firms with high 
ROA are likely to have more valuable assets in place and, hence, higher access to debt financing. Neither the 
acquirer leverage nor the acquirer cash reserve seems to have much influence on the use of debt financing.  
Results show that an equity financing is less likely to be used when target is unlisted. This result can be explained by 
two factors. On the one hand, the sale of the target is motivated by a lack of liquidity and, consequently target 
shareholders prefer a cash payment. On the other hand, acquirer shareholders are averse to the creation of a new 
blockholder, and thus, to its monitoring role, since unlisted targets ownership is often concentrated. Results also 
show that equity financing is less likely to be used in cross border acquisitions. This finding may be due to 
differences in shareholders protection standards between countries. 
Column 2 of table 2 presents the second logit model estimating the probability that an acquisition is financed 
exclusively with internal funds, compared to the debt financing benchmark. We find that the relative deal size of the 
acquirer significantly affects the choice between the two financing sources. The likelihood of using only internal 
funds to finance the transaction is low when the relative deal size ratio is high. However, and consistent with the 
pecking order theory predictions, we find that it is more likely to use internal funds if the ratio cash reserve to deal 
value is relatively high. 
Finally, column 3 presents the third logit model estimating the probability that an acquisition is financed with a 
combination of debt and equity, compared to only debt financing. We show that using only debt and cash is more 
likely when the pre-acquisition profitability of the acquirer is high. We also find that firms avoid mix financing in 
cross border acquisitions due to the reluctance of issuing equity in an international context. The likelihood of using 
both equity and debt financing method is high when firms are multiple acquirers. This finding can be explained by 
the high level of the financing needs for these multiple acquirers, which compels them to use different sources of 
financing. 
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Table2. Determinants of financing decision 
 (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) 
 Eq vs. D IF vs. D C vs. D 
Fam_Vote 
 
Fam_Wedge 
 
Valuation Error 
 
RUNUP 
 
ROA 
 
Leverage 
 
Cash Reserve 
 
Size 
 
RDS 
 
Multiple Acquirer 
 
Unlisted Target 
 
Cross Border 
 
Constant 
 
-3.170*** 
 (0.003) 
 6.992** 
 (0.018) 
 0.716*** 
 (0.003) 
 10.37* 
 (0.071) 
-6.088** 
 (0.027) 
-1.201 
 (0.131) 
 0.082 
 (0.225) 
-0.326*** 
 (0.001) 
 0.679 
 (0.425) 
 0.658 
 (0.110) 
-1.225*** 
 (0.001) 
-1.172*** 
 (0.003) 
 5.477*** 
 (0.000) 
-0.251 
 (0.815) 
-6.046 
 (0.153) 
-0.301 
 (0.417) 
 3.503 
 (0.679) 
 1.386 
 (0.632) 
-0.911 
 (0.365) 
 0.126* 
 (0.069) 
-0.533*** 
 (0.000) 
-15.19*** 
 (0.002) 
 0.362 
 (0.454) 
 0.143 
 (0.817) 
-0.895* 
 (0.091) 
 8.625*** 
 (0.000) 
 0.367 
 (0.746) 
-6.628 
 (0.161) 
 0.099 
 (0.694) 
 4.448 
 (0.461) 
-6.248** 
 (0.046) 
-1.351 
 (0.114) 
-0.316 
 (0.134) 
 0.094 
 (0.389) 
 0.914 
 (0.319) 
 0.999** 
 (0.018) 
-0.613 
 (0.146) 
-0.865** 
 (0.042) 
-0.769 
 (0.674) 
 
N. Observations 
Wald-Chi² 
Prob Chi² 
Pseudo R² 
 
265 
118.44 
0.0000 
0.2805 
D is debt financing. Eq is equity financing. IF is internal funds financing. C is a combination of debt and equity financing. Fam_Vote is voting 
rights of the family. Fam_Wedge is the difference between family voting rights and cash-flow rights. Valuation Error is the acquirer 
undervaluation or overvaluation estimated based on Chemmanur et al. (2009) recommendations. RUNUP is the cumulative abnormal return over 
the year proceeding the acquisition announcement month. ROA is the earning before interest and taxes divided by book value of assets. Leverage 
is total debt divided by market value of assets. Cash Reserve is cash and cash equivalents divided by deal value. Size is the logarithm of total 
assets measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding the acquisition. Relative Deal Size is the deal value divided by the market value of the 
acquiring firm. Multiple Acquirer is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquirer completes at least three acquisitions between 1997 and 2008.  
Unlisted Target is a dummy variable equal to 1 if target is an unlisted firm and 0 otherwise. Cross Border is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
target is not a French firm, and 0 otherwise. The table reports the estimates of a multinomial logit model that includes three binary logit models. 
Each binary logit predicts a likelihood of choosing one of first three alternatives to the likelihood of choosing the benchmark, which is debt 
financing. A Wald test is used to test for significance of the estimated coefficients and the overall regression. The statistics are based on 
Huber/White (Sandwich estimator) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
5. Robustness checks 
 
In this section, we test the robustness of our results by revising the sample selection criteria, the family variables 
definition and the methodology used. First, we focus on large acquisitions that we supposed to have an important 
impact on capital and ownership structures. We use a subsample of acquisitions, in which the relative size of the 
deal value to the acquirer’s market value of assets is at least 10%. We repeat our analysis using this subsample, 
composed of 154 acquisitions, and we find that results are qualitatively unchanged. Second, we use family cash-
flow rights rather than family voting rights. In addition, we measure the wedge as the voting rights to cash-flow 
rights ratio rather than the difference between voting rights and cash-flow rights. We find similar signs and 
statistical significance. Third, we use equity financing as a benchmark alternative in the multinomial logit model 
rather than debt financing. We find unchanged results. Finally, although Hausman and McFadden (1984) tests fail to 
reject the (IIA) assumption and show that the multinomial logit is an appropriate specification to study the financing 
decision of the acquirer, we use a multinomial probit model that supposes the (IIA) assumption is not respected. Our 
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analysis shows similar results. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper examines whether a family control of the acquirer affects the financing decision in acquisitions. Our 
sample consists of 265 acquisitions undertaken by French listed firms during the 1997-2008 period. We use a 
multinomial logit model that allows choosing between four financing alternatives: Internal funds, debt financing, 
equity financing, and a combination of debt and equity. We find that in family-controlled firms, it is more likely to 
finance the acquisition with debt rather than with equity. This finding indicates that the financing decision is 
motivated by the avoidance of the dilution risk. We show that the separation between ownership and control in 
family firms affects the financing choices. It is more likely to use equity financing than debt financing when the 
family wedge is high. This result indicates that families that maintain the control thanks to pyramidal structures and 
the double voting rule are less reluctant to equity financing. We also study the role of acquirer and acquisition 
characteristics in the determination of the financing source. We find that overvalued acquirers, or acquirers that 
experience significant share price increases prior to the acquisitions, are more likely to use equity financing instead 
of debt financing. However, we show that the higher the size and profitability of the acquirer, the higher the 
likelihood of using debt financing. Debt financing is preferred to other sources when the target firm is unlisted or is 
a foreign firm. Consistent with the pecking order theory predictions, we find that using internal funds, compared to 
debt financing, is more likely if the cash reserves are relatively sufficient to finance the transaction. However, the 
likelihood of using only internal funds to finance the transaction is low when the relative deal size ratio is high. 
 
Appendix A. Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Family_Vote: Voting rights held by the family 
Family Wedge: The difference between family voting rights and cash-flow rights 
 
Valuation Error: The acquirer undervaluation or overvaluation estimated based on Chemmanur et al. 
(2009) recommendations 
RUNUP: The cumulative abnormal return over the year preceding the acquisition announcement 
month 
ROA: Earnings before interest and tax divided by the book value of assets 
 
Leverage: Total debt divided by the market value of assets 
 
Cash Reserve: Cash and cash equivalents scaled by the total assets 
Size Logarithm of total assets 
Relative Deal Size: The deal value scaled by market value of the acquiring firm 
Multiple Acquirer: A dummy variable equal to 1 if acquirer makes at least three acquisitions between 1997 
and 2008 
Unlisted Target: A dummy variable equal to 1 if target is an unlisted firm and 0 otherwise 
Cross Border: A dummy variable equal to 1 if the target is not a French firm, and 0 otherwise 
 
 
Appendix B. The residual income model 
 
As Chemmanur et al. (2009), we implement the residual income model following the set-up used by D’Mello 
and Shroff (2000), and by Jindra (2000). Firm value is determined as the sum of its book value and discounted 
future earnings in excess of a normal return on book value. 
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0B : The book value of equity per share at the end of the fiscal year in which the acquisition was announced; 
EPS : The earnings per share;  
r : The required rate of return on the acquirer’s equity. We measure r as the firm-specific rate of return, obtained 
from the market model with beta calculated over 251 trading days ending on the 11th trading day before the 
acquisition announcement. The risk-free rate is the annualized one-month EURIBOR rate during the month 
preceding the acquisition announcement. The market risk premium is the annualized average difference between the 
rate of return on the SBF 250 value-weighted index and the one-month EURIBOR rate over thirty-six months before 
the acquisition announcement. 
TV : The terminal value is calculated as follows: 
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If the terminal value is negative, Chemmanur et al. (2009) recommend setting it equal to zero because managers are 
unlikely to continue negative NPV investments forever. The terminal value is calculated as an average of residual 
earnings in years 2 and 3 to avoid the effect of a possible unusual performance in year 3. 
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